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A character enters or is left onstage alone (solus, or in this case sola), and speaks (loqui).   
Except, of course, they are not alone.   An audience—maybe several thousand strong—is 
looking on and listening.   Other characters may be onstage by whom, according to dramatic 
convention, their speech is either un- or overheard.   They may invoke whole hosts of 
others—in apostrophes to humans, ghosts, gods, planets, or abstractions such as fate or 
fortune—with whom they argue, plead, or bargain.   They may address a part or parts of 
themselves in personified form (their heart, body, mind, soul, or thoughts), like Richard II 
whose ‘thoughts people this little world’.1   On this model, the soliloquy is less a monologue 
than an inner dialogue—a colloquy staged between two beings, one speaking and the other 
spoken to—such that, as described by Augustine who invented the term and by the sixteenth-
century dictionaries which imported it into English, the soliloquist is paradoxically ‘alone 
with god’.2   Augustine had turned the practice of Socratic dialectic within so that (as 
enshrined in the Platonic dialogues) the use of question and answer to arrive at truth became 
an internal matter: a way of organising and disciplining thought to achieve the same end.3   
The thinking mind is able to commune with itself in concentrated solitude, however, only 
because it remains in relation with an ideal Other: one that has none of the frailty or 
unreliability of the human interlocutors otherwise so briskly dispensed with.   The 
soliloquist’s inward ruminations, that is to say, are conditional upon this a priori relation.   
Indeed, however fractious or meandering they may be, those internal debates are modelled on 
that relation, for, as divine Logos or Word, God serves as guarantor both that such truth exists 
and that, however long it takes, human questioning will (or is at least theoretically able to) 
arrive at it: the desired and destined goal.   The soliloquist’s relation with God, therefore, is 
figured as an ideal specularity: with one made in the Other’s image, two potentially ‘full’, 
‘whole’ selves can exist in unbroken communion and unspoken communication with one 
another.   This relation, that is to say, is a stabilising one, for the very awareness of a 
thinking, speaking self (the cogito) comes to serve as proof both of self-existence and of a 
good God who would not deceive us: a philosophical tradition that extends from Augustine to 
Descartes if not beyond.4   With their faith in such reflections secure, the soliloquist can 
ruminate away, confident that the exercise of self-questioning—of even the most rigorous 
self-doubt—will not so much fracture or divide them as endow them with a much-admired 
complexity and ‘depth’.5 
 The soliloquist, therefore, is not alone—indeed, they are in very good company—and 
yet, for all that, they are not answered.   The God who serves as witness to their self-speech is 
conspicuous by his silence; and, when translated from philosophy to drama, the soliloquy that 
enacts such thinking in public and out loud formalises this unnerving eventuality will a quiet 
but relentless insistence.   For whatever the dramatic character’s multiple and different modes 
of address, their soliloquy elicits no reply.   Their speech might include apostrophe or self-
address; it might be unheard by some characters and/or overheard by others; it might be a 
feigned soliloquy that pretends to be unheard while intending to be overheard (such 
permutations are the source of endless play among dramatists, and especially Shakespeare); 
and, whatever else, it is most definitely heard by the audience.6   In no case, however, is that 
speech responded to, or at least not directly or verbally.7   The formality with which these 
dramatic conventions are observed, and the resistance or embarrassment that arises when 
their decorum is breached (as, for example, when a character or actor addresses the audience 
directly and pressures them for a reply) suggests—on the part of all concerned—a willing 
collusion in the special situation that is being very carefully contrived.   A situation, that is, in 
which—in full view and for all to hear—human speech goes out into the void and receives 
nothing in return, no reassuring answer or response that would indicate it had been received, 
absorbed, and affirmed if not approved (like a telephone conversation in which the person on 
the other end never breathes a word).   This is not ‘inner dialogue’—for dialogue is put on 
hold when the answer of a respondent is formalistically withheld—and, to the extent that this 
applies to ordinary conversation as much as to philosophical dialectic, soliloquy declares its 
difference from what passes for normal human discourse: the direct relay of information back 
and forth between interlocutors which shows language in its most basic, communicative, and 
instrumental function.   As opposed to the latter, monologue (which is what this special kind 
of artificially unanswered speech—addressed to what cannot, will not, answer back—is) 
marks itself out as deviant, aberrant, and strange.8   The repeated rehearsal of this situation, 
moreover, in which with everyone’s agreement the habitual response is blocked, prevented, 
or denied (anything so long as it is not forthcoming), puts utmost pressure on that ideal Other 
on whom so much depends and whose truth and existence are presumed, believed, trusted, 
and so devoutly to be wished.   If everyone is silent, including those who manifestly hear, 
then who is to say the silence soliloquy evokes is proof of presence rather than absence?   At 
the very least, it puts faith in that presence to the test—draws attention to the fact that the 
Other in soliloquy is problematized, mystified, enigmatic, diffuse—with predictable 
consequences for the equanimity of the cogito and of the ‘full’, ‘whole’ self it supposedly 
represents.   Soliloquy might, therefore, put one in mind of another situation—no less 
artificially contrived—in which a speaker is again denied the reply they ardently desire and 
may well consider theirs by right: 
 
Let us ask ourselves instead where this frustration comes from.   Is it from the 
analyst’s silence?   Responding to the subject’s empty speech—even and 
especially in an approving manner—often proves, by its effects, to be far more 
frustrating than silence.   Isn’t it, rather, a frustration that is inherent in the 
subject’s very discourse?   Doesn’t the subject become involved here in an ever 
greater dispossession of himself as a being, concerning which—by dint of sincere 
portraits which leave the idea of his being no less incoherent, of rectifications that 
do not succeed in isolating its essence, of stays and defenses that do not prevent 
his statue from tottering, of narcissistic embraces that become like a puff of air in 
animating it—he ends up recognizing that this being has never been anything 
more than his own construction in the imaginary and that this construction 
undercuts all certainty in him?   For in the work he does to reconstruct it for 
another, he encounters anew the fundamental alienation that made him construct 
it like another, and that has always destined it to be taken away from him by 
another.9 
 
The soliloquist, therefore, is not alone, but neither are they (as that word would imply) 
‘one’, either.10   Instead, like every human subject, they emerge in and through language: a 
differential field in which subjectivity is organised—just as meaning is—by absence and 
difference.11   The faithful soliloquist who is ‘alone with god’ projects that constitutive 
absence or difference outward: it is the unbridgeable gap that falls between self and Other but 
that nonetheless allows both to be conceived as entities, ‘full’ and ‘whole’, facing, reflecting, 
and proving one another’s existence.   The doubting soliloquist, on the other hand, is the 
product—the effect—of absence and difference, in a way that has decisive consequences for 
any hopes or claims to have a ‘self’ (as if that were some inalienable possession or right), 
least of all a deep one.   This soliloquist is not a unity—an entity, an individual unique, self-
identical, and undivided—but is, rather, eccentric, elliptical, off-kilter in the sense of being 
other-centred; and it is not ‘atomic’ in the sense of being ‘un-cut’ but, rather, ‘castrated’, 
wounded, split.   In this respect, therefore, the true soliloquist might be said to appear most 
visibly in the sex which is ‘not one’, although not in any crudely identificatory way that 
would see such metaphorical features as embodied in ‘women’, since to do that is merely to 
revert to the notion of individualised, essential selves.12   Rather, true soliloquy might be said 
to be the female soliloquy in the sense that literary constructions of the female voice may 
perhaps be taken to show the subjectivity that is alienated in and by (or the subjection to) 




The purpose of this preamble, then, is to arrive at the suggestion that the source and origin of 
soliloquy as such—soliloquy in this its most radical function, since it shows the true (and 
truly unsettling) nature of human subjectivity whatever the circumstances of any particular 
case—might be located in the tradition of female complaint: and that regardless of whether 
those soliloquies end up being spoken by ‘male’ or ‘female’ characters, a binary deeply 
compromised, in any case, by the acting conventions of the sixteenth-century stage.   The 
tradition of female complaint is an ancient and trans-generic one—encompassing narrative, 
epic, lyric, drama, epic, and epistle—and fielding a series of iconic figures that range from 
the Bible’s Niobe, to Homer’s Hecuba, Sophocles’ Electra, Euripides’ Medea, Virgil’s Dido, 
and the numerous complaining heroines of Ovid’s Heroides and Metamorphoses.   Such 
literary figurations inform, in turn, a long and no less engaged native tradition in which 
female-voiced lament appears in texts such as Henryson’s Testament of Cresseid, the Mirror 
for Magistrates, Daniel’s Complaint of Rosamund, Drayton’s England’s Heroicall Epistles, 
and, of course, Shakespeare’s narrative poems.13   The classical tradition of female complaint 
would have been thoroughly familiar to recipients of the Tudor education system, moreover, 
not least through the pedagogic practice of ethopoeia in which boys were encouraged to 
develop a suitably rhetorical style by identifying with literary figures of the ancient past—
among them these exempla of female lament—and composing speeches on their behalf.14   
Trained early on in this kind of ‘transvestite ventriloquism’ or ‘vocal cross-dressing’, those 
pupils who went on to become writers would choose, time and again, to speak in a voice that 
was signalled as female and as suffering, and to experiment with the ‘sustained articulation of 
a feminine moi’ it allowed them.15 
In sixteenth century England that voice had a very distinctive sound.   For we should 
not forget that blank verse—the unrhymed, stressed, iambic pentameter line that would 
become the staple of Elizabethan drama but was still a ‘strange metre’ when it first 
appeared—made its debut in Surrey’s translation of Book IV of the Aeneid: a text that is 
dominated by female voices (nearly a third of it comprises direct speech by Dido and her 
sister Anna) and includes the two soliloquies (of 27 and 57 lines apiece) that Dido makes 
prior to her suicide.16   When English men and women first heard blank verse, therefore, they 
heard it in Dido’s voice.   They heard it in in her agony and rage at the departure of Aeneas; 
in the disintegration of her ‘I’ (‘What sayde I? but where am I? what fransy / Alters thy 
mynde, vnhappy Dido?’); in her thought that she might have murdered Aeneas’ son, 
Ascanius, ‘And set hym on hys fathers borde for meate’ (sig.D3v)—indeed, that she might 
have destroyed ‘The father, sonne, and all theyr nacion’, as well as herself—and in her 
summoning of other dark female forces by way of revenge: ‘Proserpyne thou, vpon whom 
folke do vse / To houle, and call in forked wayes by nyght, / Infernall furyes eke, ye wreakers 
of wrong…Receyue these wordes’ (sig.D4).   I quote Dido’s soliloquy at some length only 
because it epitomises so many features of the female complaint tradition and serves as an 
important crossing point from poetry into drama.   For her speech articulates the loss not only 
of a lover but of a potential husband, king, father, and male heir—confronting Aeneas earlier, 
she had suggested that she would not ‘seeme forsaken’ if she had borne him a son (sig.C2)—
the loss, in other words, of an entire male genealogy and bloodline and, with it, of the 
continuation of patriarchal control and political order down through the generations.   It is 
presented as what speech would look like—what speech would sound like—in a world no 
longer organised by the phallus.   In Marlowe’s play, which dramatizes—indeed, concludes 
with—a similar scene, Dido destroys the sword on which Aeneas had faithlessly promised ‘to 
be true to me’ as a token of male perfidy: of the manifest failure, that is, of a world so 
organised to make words correspond with meaning.17 
And this, by and large, is what speakers in the female complaint tradition have in 
common: a situation in which—as the result, typically, of male violence (swords usually 
come into it)—they are without the phallus they might have possessed in the future (former 
lovers have abandoned them, often for war), or might once have possessed in the past 
(husbands, sons, and fathers have been killed), or never possessed in the first place (a fact 
forcibly imposed on them by rape).   To that extent, their situation is emblematic of a 
‘castrated’ subjectivity: a subjectivity that is not organised by—and is, indeed, demonstrably 
the victim of—those illusions of a subjective ‘fullness’, ‘wholeness’, ‘truth’, ‘meaning’, 
‘existence’, ‘presence’, and ‘depth’ that in some quarters the soliloquy is still taken to 
celebrate.   The speech of such female complainants, therefore, often opens out onto a whole 
other world—its difference signalled none too subtly by associations with darkness, the 
infernal, the occult—in which the old order comes to a permanent and shattered end: an end 
the speakers sometimes hasten on themselves, as when Dido fantasises the murder of Aeneas, 
Ascanius, and their whole ‘nacion’.   In Gorboduc, Queen Videna mourns the murder of her 
eldest son, who might have lived ‘And to his aged father comfort brought, / With some young 
son in whom they both might live’—the male bloodline at stake once again—and promptly 
destroys exactly that by resolving to stab her younger son to death for committing the murder 
in the first place (at 81 lines, this is by far the longest soliloquy of the play).18   Such speech 
is always passionate, and it frequently borders on madness: but these serve as measures—
very precisely calibrated, in literary terms—of its distance from the supposedly ordinary, 
normal, ‘rational’ speech (in the name of which the old order governed) rather than as 
expressions of some ‘inner’ state or symptoms of a deranged ‘mind’.19 
 It has been suggested that when male authors ventriloquize the female voice and enter 
into a female role (an act that could be seen as appropriative, after all, and thus as implicitly 
violent) their aim—conscious or otherwise—is to perpetuate the patriarchal order by 
affirming lack as the essential condition of ‘women’ and phallic power, conversely, as the 
essential condition of ‘men’ (the literary tradition of female complaint has even been seen as 
an exercise in one-upmanship in which male poets compete to see who might do it best).20   
That is certainly possible, and will ensure with equal certainty that the battle of the sexes 
grinds interminably on.   But it is also possible, I think, that a ‘male’ author might choose to 
identify with a position scripted as ‘female’ in language—in literature—in order to become 
more familiar with that uncanny experience of an alienated and de-centred subjectivity 
which, insofar as it emerges similarly out of language, is common to every human being.   It 
might, in fact, be precisely to test the parameters of a position scripted as ‘male’ in 
language—in literature, in history, in society—that male poets should find themselves 
repeatedly drawn to scenes in which voices speak of a subjectivity that is neither whole nor 
divided into tidy ‘selves’ that can debate rationally with one another but, rather, quite literally 




Female soliloquy might thus be taken as the special instance of a general truth: namely, that 
insofar as it goes unanswered all true soliloquy—regardless of who speaks it—represents the 
utterance of an unwhole, ‘cut’, or ‘castrated’ subjectivity, a model for which might be found 
in the ancient and much-rehearsed tradition of female complaint.   This analysis, moreover, 
makes it possible to identify two features that Shakespeare, in particular, was to scrutinise 
with a special focus in his poetry and his plays.   The first of these is the situation discussed 
already in which the subject in question is marked as existing or about to exist outside the 
phallic order, where that is figured as the loss (past or future) or lack (present) of the 
phallus—something that can be coded as both comic (as in Venus and Adonis) and tragic (as 
in The Rape of Lucrece)—and/or as the failure of words (supposedly guaranteed by the 
phallic order) to mean what they say: often through the experience, discovery, and 
consequences of (typically male) perjury or broken vows (as in A Lover’s Complaint).   The 
second feature, not yet discussed but closely related to the first, is the situation in which the 
subject in question is shown to take their identity—including their most powerful passions 
and most intimate, ‘private’ feelings—not from some now demonstrably imaginary ‘interior’ 
(that mirage of a full, whole, inner self of unplumbed depths) but rather from the outside.   
Counterintuitive as this may seem, such a situation is the entirely logical conclusion of a 
subject that does not possess a self (like some kind of bourgeois commodity) but is, rather, 
beside itself; that is not self-possessed (comfortably whole in the guaranteeing presence of 
another) but, rather, dispossessed, or—if possessed at all—then possessed by that other as if 
by some external, ‘daimonic’ force (this, incidentally, is what ‘ventriloquy’ meant in the 
period, adding to the suggestion that ‘male’ poets who ventriloquized ‘female’ voices may 
have done so to experience alienation not to exercise power).22   Shakespeare’s poems and 
plays, that is, repeatedly come back to this antifoundationalist model of human subjectivity in 
which, however unnerving, uncanny, strange this might seem, it is nonetheless evident that 
the most heartfelt passions—love or hate—are drawn from superficies rather than depths and 
are all too readily transferable.   This is the lesson of A Lover’s Complaint in which the 
female soliloquist (who speaks for a total of 258 lines) reveals that she loved the youth who 
abandoned her not for his qualities—she knew he was a rogue from the start—but purely 
because other women loved him: and they likewise, for there is no original, authenticating, 
prior, or ‘true’ love of one person for another that sets off the series, but only an infinite 
regress of imitations and imitations of imitations that are no less powerfully felt or life-
changing for that.23   And it is manifestly the lesson of Hamlet in which the male protagonist 
(who soliloquises for a total of 211 lines) discovers that feelings do not, in fact, come from 
having ‘that within’ (I.ii.85) but, rather, from imitating that which is without (in both senses 
of that word): a lesson he and we could learn by watching a (male) actor imitate a (female) 
character—and iconic figure of the female complaint tradition, no less, who is mourning the 
violent loss of her sons, husband, king, and city—whose tears, which could not be more 
designedly factitious and literary if they tried, nonetheless bring tears to his (the actor’s) eyes, 
tears which could not be more designedly factitious and literary, either, but are no less ‘real’ 
and moving for that.24    
 These two features, then—being without the phallus and sourcing identity from 
without—appear, as one might expect them to, in soliloquies spoken by female characters 
(often when they are disguised as or aspiring to be ‘men’) in both comic and tragic 
figurations.   In Venus and Adonis the absence of the phallus—which between the aroused 
female goddess and the reluctant maidenly boy is nowhere to be found (except, perhaps, in 
the latter’s horse and in the boar that gores him)—is a matter of high comedy, and the 
nocturnal lament that issues from Venus in consequence is, appropriately enough, the acme 
of what Lacan might call ‘empty speech’:  
 
And now she beats her heart, whereat it groans, 
That all the neighbor caves, as seeming troubled, 
Make verbal repetition of her moans; 
Passion on passion deeply is redoubled: 
‘Ay me!’ she cries, and twenty times, ‘Woe, woe!’ 
And twenty echoes twenty times cry so. (lines 829-34) 
 
In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Helena’s 26-line soliloquy in couplets (I.i.226-52)—a 
complaint that the boy she loves loves someone else—articulates nothing so clearly as 
desire’s chaos-causing tendency to be driven by surface, not depth, and its blithe defiance of 
any supposed ‘logic’ of inwardness or desert:  
 
And as he errs, doting on Hermia’s eyes, 
So I, admiring of his qualities. (lines 230-31)  
 
There is error all round when there is no truth within: an observation that leads to familiar 
reflections not only on love’s proverbial blindness, but on the inability, once that consolingly 
metaphysical logic is dispensed with, of words—even sworn oaths and binding vows—to 
mean anything whatsoever: ‘Love is perjur’d every where’ (line 241).   In Twelfth Night, 
Viola (disguised as ‘Cesario’) reflects—in a 25-line blank verse soliloquy which ends in a 
deceptively conclusive couplet (II.ii.17-41)—that Olivia has fallen for ‘him’ (rather than for 
Orsino on whose behalf ‘he’ sued for her love), and this solely on the basis of ‘his’ patently 
false and yet evidently all too believable exterior: ‘Fortune forbid my outside have not 
charm’d her!’ (line 18).   Like Helena, she (or perhaps one should say ‘she’) compares the 
blindness others show in love with her own: 
 
How will this fadge?   My master loves her dearly, 
And I (poor monster) fond as much on him; 
And she (mistaken) seems to dote on me. (lines 33-35) 
 
Again, error seems to be all around, and there is no guarantee that any of these loves is based 
on anything more substantive or true: an uncertainty, moreover, that now extends to gender 
identity and to what, if anything, lies conclusively beneath the external signifiers of dress.25    
Similar themes are worked through in Cymbeline—another play in which the fidelity 
of outside to inside is put into question—and where Imogen (disguised as ‘Fidele’) speaks in 
soliloquy (IV.ii.291-332) to convince herself that the headless corpse she finds beside her is 
that of her husband, Posthumous.   She identifies the body not only by its clothes but most 
convincingly, she thinks, by its parts (leg, hand, foot, thigh), much as Iachimo had earlier 
inventoried her own sleeping body as ‘proof’ of his seduction: ‘a voucher, / Stronger than 
ever law could make’ (II.ii.39-40).   The identification proves wrong, of course—appearance 
and reality do not marry up—but in the course of the play romance conventions will work to 
restore that fidelity by locating it in the aristocratic legitimacy of the male bloodline: although 
brought up as outcasts in a cave, Imogen’s long-lost brothers display an innate nobility quite 
absent in her evil half-brother, Cloten (which is why the headless corpse, naturally, is his). 
If these plays put the phallic order to the test, then as comedies and romances they 
move toward reinstating it.   The same cannot be said of the more ‘problematic’ comedies, 
however.   In Troilus and Cressida, in a 14-line soliloquy of rhyming couplets (I.ii.281-95), 
Cressida divulges that she has been playing hard to get for the very good reason that desire 
for what is still ‘ungain’d’ (lines 289, 293) can be absolutely guaranteed.   To ensure that her 
lover’s desire lasts as long as possible, therefore, she proposes to keep up appearances: 
 
Then though my heart’s content firm love doth bear, 
Nothing of that shall from mine eyes appear. (lines 294-95) 
 
The problem, of course, is just where one might locate evidence for that ‘firm love’ if all we 
have is her word for it and external behaviours that would seem to indicate the opposite.   
What evidence, in fact, does one have for anything other than words, actions, and 
appearances, any or all of which may lie?   The ‘inward’ qualities of truth, verifiability, and 
proof that the earlier comedies had tested but ultimately restored are, in this case, much more 
elusive and their metaphysical logic not reinstated by the ending of the play (Cressida 
opportunistically goes off with someone else).   Similarly, in All’s Well That Ends Well, 
Helena uses a 20-line soliloquy (I.i.79-98) to inform the startled audience of a flat 
contradiction between the sorrow she affects—everyone thinks she is mourning for her 
father’s recent death, but ‘I think not on my father…What was he like? / I have forgot him’ 
(lines 79, 81-2)—and the sorrow she now tells us she really feels: for the imminent departure 
of Bertram whom she secretly loves.   As in the case of Cressida (and, arguably, Hamlet), it is 
precisely by adverting to what lies within that Helena’s soliloquy serves to strain if not break 
any confidence that a continuity exists between inside and outside, or, indeed, that there 
might be any ‘within’ at all.   It is no surprise, therefore, to find that her love for the 
supremely shallow Bertram is based on appearances no less superficial: namely, the pin-up 
brow, eye, and curls she has committed to her heart.   Like her namesake in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, this Helena’s love (or ‘fancy’) is confessedly ‘idolatrous’ (line 97)—
basically, empty of content—and her determination to have Bertram come what may does not 
necessarily convince us either that this love of hers is particularly ‘deep’, or that the phallic 
order (supposedly responsible for maintaining presence, inwardness, truth, and meaning, and 
represented by the marriage she finally achieves) has, in any decisive way, been restored.26 
 The end or absence of the phallic order—and the thinkability (if only that) of an 
alternative to it—is the business of tragedy.   The rape of Lucrece not only reminds the 
heroine of her lack of the phallus in the most violent way imaginable but also serves 
conclusively to destroy the existing patriarchal system of marriage, legitimacy, and orderly 
generation: a cataclysm she figures in her first soliloquy—at a total of 400 lines, 
Shakespeare’s longest by far—as an irreversible passing of day (a world that made sense) 
into night (one bereft of intelligibility).   In her second soliloquy (a mere 56 lines)—prompted 
by a painting of the fall of Troy—Lucrece identifies with the figure of ‘despairing Hecuba’ 
(line 1447) and ‘shapes her sorrow to the beldame’s woes’ (line 1458):  
 
‘Poor instrument,’ quoth she, ‘without a sound,  
I’ll tune thy woes with my lamenting tongue’. (lines 1464-65)   
 
Like the Player in Hamlet, she locates her grief not within but without: her lament is palpably 
the imitation of an imitation and shows how represented tears draw ‘real’—but still, of 
course, represented—tears.   And, like Hamlet himself (though perhaps more effectively), she 
serves as the recorder or flute which, given breath, ‘will discourse most eloquent music’: for 
the heart of her mystery—what her story demonstrates—is precisely a human subjectivity 
that lacks a centre, a core, a reality that has been forced upon her consciousness by means of 
traumatic violence.   In her very speaking and sounding—in the music that classically marks 
its difference from supposedly ‘normal’ speech—she is nothing but a hollow reed.27    
Shakespeare’s other tragic female soliloquists share much of the burden of Lucrece’s 
song.   In her first soliloquy—relatively short at 16 lines—Juliet gets straight to the point by 
querying the supposed relation between word and meaning: 
 
What’s Montague?   It is nor hand nor foot, 
Nor arm nor face, nor any other part 
Belonging to a man. (II.ii.40-42) 
 
In wishing that Romeo might ‘Deny thy father and refuse thy name’ (line 34)—or even ‘doff 
thy name…which is no part of thee’ (lines 47-8)—Juliet effectively scopes out an alternative 
system and an alternative subjectivity that is ‘castrated’ only in its defiance of the phallic 
order that otherwise insists on attaching signified to signifier (the Nom/Non du Père is very 
visible here).   Almost if she had summoned that alternative system into being, the play goes 
on to record the collapse of the old order in now familiar ways: deprived of her beloved by 
means of male violence (men fighting with swords, predictably enough), Juliet will subsist 
thereafter in the state of loss she has been in all along, subjectively speaking, but which her 
separation from Romeo brings home to her in no uncertain terms.   That state is figured, 
moreover—exactly as it would be by Lucrece—as a symbolic shift from day to night.   The 
irony of Juliet’s third and longest soliloquy (III.ii.1-31)—which, spoken at midnight as she 
awaits Romeo’s coming, mirrors her second (II.v.1-17), spoken at midday as she had awaited 
the Nurse and news of their imminent marriage—is that what she excitedly expects to be her 
wedding night turns out to be the interminable night of existential loss with which Lucrece 
characterises her condition.   Since Juliet does not yet know that Romeo has been banished, 
her repeated invocations of night—‘Come civil night, / Thou sober-suited matron all in 
black’, ‘Come, night, come, Romeo, come, thou day in night’, ‘Come, gentle night, come, 
loving, black-brow’d night’ (lines 10-11, 17, 20)—do not sound to her as they might to us: 
like an unwitting spell that summons the dark and female forces of the night (as Dido did) to 
trace the contours of a world in which the phallic order has been well and truly dismantled. 
It may seem odd to associate Juliet with witchcraft, but it puts her in company with 
Shakespeare’s other tragic female soliloquist, who first speaks sola when she enters reading 
her husband’s letter about his meeting with the ‘weird sisters’ (I.v.8).   Where Juliet had 
resisted the phallic order, however, Lady Macbeth seeks to reinforce it, using the 33-line 
soliloquy that follows—interrupted only by the messenger who brings news of Duncan’s 
arrival (I.v.15-30, 38-54)—to articulate her determination to boost and bolster her husband’s 
otherwise slack resolve.   She will have none of such ‘castrated’ subjectivity and summons 
the forces of darkness to endow her with a phallic potency instead: 
 
Come, you spirits 
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here… 
   Come, thick night, 
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell, 
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes. (lines 40-41, 50-52) 
 
Her attempt fails—not because it denies her essential ‘femininity’ but because it denies a 
human subjectivity that is constitutively other-centred, eccentric, and displaced—which is 
why, the next time we see her soliloquise (in Act V, scene i), her grand blank verse has given 
way to symptomatic prose that (in a still new variant on monologic speech) is not even heard 
by the speaker herself.   Lady Macbeth’s sleep-talking is Shakespeare’s most poignant 
example, perhaps, of speech that comes from beside and outside the cogito—the ‘self’—and 
of what a decentred and self-estranged subjectivity might sound like, if given a voice. 
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